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What Is a Corporation?                                                    
Liberal, Confucian, and Socialist Theories of Enterprise 
Organization (and State, Family, and Personhood) 
Teemu Ruskola 
[I]t is a serious oversimplification to categorize modern Western le-
gal systems as ideological reflections of capitalism. Much modern 
law is more feudal in character than capitalist. Much defies any 
characterization in socioeconomic terms. A more complex system 
of categorization and characterization is needed, which will draw 
not only on types of economic and political formation but also on 
philosophical, religious, and other kinds of criteria.
1
 
– Harold J. Berman 
Contract, that greediest of legal categories, which once wanted to 
devour the state, resents being told that it cannot painlessly digest 
even a joint-stock company.
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– Frederick W. Maitland 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
What is a corporation? An easy, but not very informative, answer is 
that it is a person—a legal person, that is. More substantive answers sug-
gest that it is a moral person, a person/thing, a production team, a nexus 
of private agreements, a city, a semi-sovereign, a (secular) God, or a 
penguin (kind of).
3
 Surprisingly, despite the economic, political, and so-
cial importance of the corporate form, we do not have a generally ac-
cepted legal theory of what a corporation is, apart from the law’s ques-
tionable assertion that it is a “person.” Insofar as legal scholars theorize 
corporation law, they draw predominantly on economic theories of “the 
firm”—economists’ umbrella term for business enterprise.
4
 
In this speculative essay, I hope to place the idea, and law, of the 
corporation in a comparative context and to suggest, following the Eng-
lish legal historian Frederic Maitland, that corporation law is a “theme 
from the borderland where ethical speculation marches with jurispru-
dence.”
5
 I do so not to question the utility of economic theories of the 
corporation as such but to suggest that by thinking in terms of broader 
concepts—such as organization of economic enterprise more generally—
and by considering those concepts in the context of the larger political 
                                                         
 3. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE 
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Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 248 (1999); Claire Moore Dickerson, Corporations As Cities: Targeting the 
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economy in which economic enterprise is necessarily embedded, we will 
be able to see better the utility and limits of any particular theory.
6
 
Below, I outline theories of enterprise organization in three ideal-
typical worlds that I call liberal, Confucian, and socialist. My template 
for liberalism in this sense is the United States while the main source of 
my idealized notions of Confucian and socialist polities are late imperial 
China and the People’s Republic of China before the inception of eco-
nomic reforms in 1978, respectively. Exemplifying distinctive political 
and moral economies, they help us see more clearly some of the assump-
tions we make about (U.S.) corporation law. At the outset, I want to state 
that my aim here is not to advocate or defend any one of the three theo-
ries I outline below. To the contrary, I argue that each of them has dis-
tinctive conceptual difficulties in justifying the organization of economic 
enterprise in the form of corporate entities.
7
 None of the theories is self- 
evidently superior to the others. Collectively, they offer a range of differ-
ent possibilities with distinctive social, political, and moral visions.    
Rather, what a comparative analysis of different theories of enterprise 
organization can do is to bring to focus the cultural specificity of each. 
What economists ordinarily call the theory of the firm is in fact best 
thought as a liberal theory of the firm, which assumes in turn a particular 
division of labor among the institutions of the market, the state, and the 
family. Stated in the parlance of economics, not only institutions of the 
material kind but even our theories about them can become path-
dependent, losing sight of the historical contingency of the phenomena 
they seek to analyze.  
In Part II, I briefly sketch the broad ideological contours of liberal-
ism, Confucianism, and Chinese state socialism, while Part III examines 
the theoretical status and place of economic enterprise in each. Part IV 
analyzes some of the ways in which all three theories of enterprise organ-
ization resort to distinctive ideological fictions to maintain their internal 
coherence: fabrications of corporate personhood, invented kinship, and 
                                                         
 6. I am by no means the only scholar to argue for broader theoretical frameworks. See, e.g., 
HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, LAW AND 
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PREINDUSTRIAL STUDIES (1983). For a 
broadly functionalist approach in an expressly comparative frame, see REINER H. KRAAKMAN ET 
AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (Reiner 
H. Kraakman et al. eds., 2004). 
 7. I use a minimalist definition of the corporation, borrowing from SHAW LIVERMORE, EARLY 
AMERICAN LAND COMPANIES: THEIR INFLUENCE ON CORPORATE DEVELOPMENT (Beard Books 
2000) (1939). For Livermore, an enterprise takes on “corporate” characteristics insofar as it institutes 
a division of labor among individuals who participate in it solely as investors, on the one hand, and 
persons who manage its operation, on the other—that is, a separation between ownership and man-
agement, which typically occurs as the size and complexity of an enterprise increase. 
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aspirational unity in a socialist ideal of “the people,” respectively. Part V 
considers the practical implications of the preceding analysis in the con-
text of the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises. Part VI concludes. 
II. IDEOLOGIES AND POLITICAL ECONOMIES 
What are some key assumptions about the relationship among the 
state, the market, and the family that inform U.S.-style liberal capitalism, 
political theories of Chinese Confucianism, and pre-1978 Chinese state 
socialism? Needless to say, there are many kinds of liberalism, Confu-
cianism, and socialism. What I try to do below is to set out key terms of 
one particular type of liberalism (U.S. liberal capitalism), one type of 
Confucianism (ideology of the late imperial Chinese state), and one type 
of socialism (state socialism of the PRC before the current era of eco-
nomic reforms). I have chosen them, not because they are especially 
worthy examples of the ideologies they represent, but because they    
represent historically significant instances of each.  
It is also important to note that insofar as the accounts below per-
tain to ideologies, they must not be confused with descriptions of how 
any of the societies to which they refer have been organized in fact.
8
 
Moreover, as ideal-typical constructions, they are not fully accurate his-
torical descriptions even of the ideologies of their respective societies. 
Rather, they focus on certain salient aspects of each for the purpose of 
facilitating a comparative analysis. 
A. Liberalism: State, Market, and Family 
It is a key premise of the modern liberal state that the appropriate 
means of regulating a social interaction depends on the nature of the in-
teraction to be regulated.
9
 As that state is imagined in the United States, 
all of social life is divisible into autonomous spheres that operate, or 
ought to operate, relatively independently of each other with a unique 
rationality—a governing logic—that is proper to it. At the highest level 
of generalization, there are three distinct spheres: the political sphere of 
the state, the economic sphere of the market, and a residual sphere of 
relations of interpersonal intimacy.
10
 Tellingly, this last sphere is the 
                                                         
 8. My definition of ideology is Althusserian, as that which “represents the imaginary relation-
ship of individuals to their real conditions of existence.” LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideologi-
cal State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY, AND OTHER ESSAYS 162 (1971). 
 9. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND 
EQUALITY (1983). 
 10. One major aspect of modern life that seems to be missing altogether in this schema is cul-
ture. Insofar as the term refers to artifacts of high culture, we might locate it in the intimate sphere, 
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least well-defined, and even the political and economic vocabulary for 
describing it is not as developed as it is for the other two spheres.       
Although it includes a broad range of associations with intimates, with 




Each of these spheres in turn has a unique governing logic that is 
proper to it. The political sphere of the state is organized predominantly 
as a structure of authority. Backed by its monopoly on legitimate vio-
lence, the state is empowered to extract resources from society and redis-
tribute them on the basis of politically made determinations. It has the 
power to order an unwilling tax-payer to pay his due, displace a person 
from her home by the power of eminent domain, and even take a per-
son’s freedom or life. In the economic sphere of the market, in contrast, 
the allocation of resources among private actors takes place on the basis 
of consensual exchange. The principal governing logic of the market is 
contract. Ideally, the sphere of the family should be regulated only min-
imally, in order not to disturb the relations of intimacy that undergird it. 
When economic transfers take place among loved ones (say, unpaid do-
mestic household labor performed by a stay-at-home spouse), such trans-
actions are ideally at least attributed to altruistic motives (labor in return 
for love). We might thus say that the intimate sphere relies on the logic 
of sharing and interpersonal trust, rather than self-interested exchange. 
The three principal logics of authority, contract, and trust ought to 
operate independently of one another. For instance, the exercise of au-
thority has its necessary and proper place in the political sphere of the 
                                                                                                                              
as the privileged locus for emotional experience and the production of subjective meaning. With 
respect to commercialized forms of mass culture, we might locate it in the nexus of the market and 
the intimate sphere, as both a commodity (in the market) and a form of leisure (in the intimate 
sphere). However, we might also say that it is in fact culture in the broadest sense that determines the 
boundaries among the different spheres: the logics that operate within each sphere are ultimately 
cultural logics. 
Similarly, one might ask where civil society fits in this picture. If we define the term so broadly 
that it refers to non-state institutions generally, it would exist both in the sphere of the market and 
the intimate sphere. It is noteworthy, however, that the term “civil society” itself is less well defined 
than “the state” or “the economy,” and the fact that we have some difficulty determining its precise 
locus in this (admittedly simplistic) liberal schema probably tells us something about the ambiguous 
status of civil society itself, at least in classical liberalism. 
 The schema’s historicity is even more evident if we consider the changing place of religion. 
Once upon a time, it would surely have been a major socio-political field in its own right, but today 
we regard religion as mostly a private matter that belongs in the residual sphere of intimate experi-
ence. 
 11. I provide a slightly longer sketch of this tripartite schema and of the outlines of its histori-
cal development in Teemu Ruskola, Home Economics: What Is the Difference Between a Family 
and a Corporation?, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 324, 335–37 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. 
Williams eds., 2005). 
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state, yet direct governmental authority becomes suspect when applied to 
the market, and even more so when the object of regulation is familial or 
other intimate relationships, except insofar as regulation is vital for polic-
ing the boundaries among the different spheres and for preserving the 
integrity of the system as a whole. Likewise, the economic logic of the 
marketplace is inappropriate both in the political and intimate spheres: 
neither votes nor babies should be sold. Finally, the logic of the intimate 
sphere, or more precisely the lack of a rational logic, and reliance on love 
and trust is also best kept where it belongs—in the family and among 
friends. One trusts a politician at one’s own risk, and in the marketplace 
too bargains are ordinarily struck at arm’s length. 










State Market Family 
GOVERNING 
LOGIC 
Authority Contract Trust 
 
It is important to reiterate that this chart outlines an ideological vi-
sion. No state can rely on the basis of brute force alone, markets cannot 
function in the complete absence of trust, and families too can be battle-
fields of economic as well as physical domination rather than havens of 
love and trust. I offer this schema not to describe liberal capitalism as it 
works in practice in the United States (or anywhere on Earth) but to cap-
ture an important set of liberal intuitions that most of us share, at least to 
some extent. 
What is the status of economic enterprise in this picture?           
Remarkably, although corporate forms of enterprise are the predominant 
economic actor in liberal capitalist societies as they currently exist, they 
have an uneasy existence in liberal economic, political, and legal theory. 
The paradigmatic subject in the political and economic spheres is the 
individual. Even as the state stands in a relationship of authority over us, 
we retain certain rights against it as individuals. Likewise, in the market-
place we enter into contracts as individuals. The family, in contrast, is 
the one place where we are expected to shed our self-interested individu-
al motivations to come together with others. The corporation has no natu-
ral resting place in this order. On the one hand, as an economic entity it 
would seem to be the quintessential actor in the market. On the other 
hand, the corporation is also evidently a collective entity while the mar-
ketplace is paradigmatically an arena of interaction among self-interested 
individuals. 
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Indeed, the corporation has been a problem for legal theorists in 
considerable part because we live in a legal system that thinks in terms of 
“persons.” It has been a jurisprudential conundrum for U.S. law to justify 
the existence of collective entities such as corporations in terms that ac-
cord with liberal individualism. If all legal rights and duties must be held 
by a person, then every legal actor must be one, no matter the conceptual 
violence this may entail. It is this logic that gives birth to the legal fiction 
of the corporation as a person in its own right, as if it were a human be-
ing. 
This is a solution that only a lawyer (or a poet) could find satisfac-
tory. It is hardly theoretically adequate. Historically, there has been end-
less metaphysical speculation about whether corporations are “real” per-
sons or not.
12
 Today, there are a number of economic theories to explain 
why, even in the presumptively individualistic sphere of the market, 
there are in fact collective entities such as corporations. I will consider 
those analyses and their adequacy in Part III. First, however, let us com-
pare some of the key ideological premises of liberalism with those of 
Confucianism and socialism. 
B. Confucianism: Kinship All the Way down, and Up 
The term “Confucianism” has been used to refer to as wide a range 
of ideas and institutions as “liberalism.” Here I use it to refer to the gen-
eral features of the ideology of the late-imperial Chinese state as perpet-
uated by the civil service examination system.
13
 This orthodox form of 
Confucianism was more rigid than the philosophical forms of Confucian-
ism from which it originated. At the same time, the state’s ideological 
pronouncements must not be mistaken for the actual policies of Confu-
cian officialdom. What follows is emphatically not a description of Chi-
nese society as it ever existed; rather, it is a sketch of a historically dom-
inant state ideology. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between liberal and Confu-
cian worldviews (in the specific senses defined here) is that while the 
former seeks to divide social life into separate spheres, the aspirational 
norm of Confucianism is unity. All aspects of social life are to be regu-
lated by the fiduciary logic of Confucian kinship relations. That is, all of 
social life ought to constitute one harmonious whole governed by a sys-
tem of patriarchal norms where junior kin owe duties of obedience to 
                                                         
 12. See, e.g., Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 
643 (1932). 
 13. See generally ICHISADA MIYAZAKI, CHINA’S EXAMINATION HELL: THE CIVIL SERVICE 
EXAMINATIONS OF IMPERIAL CHINA (Conrad Schirokauer trans., Yale Univ. Press 1981) (1976). 
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those above while the senior kin in turn owe reciprocal duties of care to 
those below. 
Reflecting this outlook, not only were Chinese county magistrates 
traditionally referred to as “father-and-mother officials” (fu-mu guan)14 
but the entire state was conceptualized as a family writ large with the 
emperor as a kind of pater-familias.15 It was precisely for this reason that 
unfilial behavior in the family was subject to punishment by the state: 
defiance of paternal authority necessarily implied the possibility of defi-
ance of state authority, as the two were ultimately expressions of a single 
principle. Ideally, even economic production was organized in ways that 
respected the fiduciary norms of Confucian kinship relations as closely 
as possible, namely in families.
16
 
If we were to superimpose the Confucian normative vision on the 









In brief, the fiduciary structures of Confucian kinship should inform the 
operation of the political and economic spheres as well as the intimate 
one of familial relations in a nested hierarchy of isomorphic institutions. 
Ideally, it is kinship all the way down, and up.
17
 
                                                         
 14. T’UNG-TSU CH’Ü, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN CHINA UNDER THE CH’ING 14 (Harvard Univ. 
Press 1962). 
 15. In one classical formulation, “The son of Heaven is the parent of the people, and so be-
comes the parent of the Empire.” The Shoo King, in 3 THE CHINESE CLASSICS 333 (J. Legge ed. & 
trans., reprt ed. 1939) (1865). Although Confucius himself did not make the express parent–ruler 
analogy, his follower Mencius did, and it was indeed the Mencian interpretation that became the 
foundation for the Neo-Confucian orthodoxy. See MENCIUS 1.A.4, 3.A.3 (D.C. Lau trans., Penguin 
Books 1970). 
 16. See generally Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative 
Law and Development Theory in a Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000); see also 
DAVID FAURE, CHINA AND CAPITALISM: A HISTORY OF BUSINESS ENTEPRISE IN MODERN CHINA 
31–42 (2006); MADELINE ZELIN, THE MERCHANTS OF ZIGONG: INDUSTRIAL ENTRE-PRENEURSHIP 
IN EARLY MODERN CHINA 113–14 (2005). 
 17. Indeed, as I have observed elsewhere, kinship relations represented the ideal model even 
for intercourse among states. See TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM: CHINA, THE UNITED 
STATES, AND MODERN LAW 106–07 (2013); Teemu Ruskola, Raping Like a State, 57 UCLA L. REV. 
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We have already noted liberal theory’s difficulties in accounting for 
the existence of corporate forms of enterprise. Their collective nature is 
not a problem for Confucianism: it is axiomatic that collectives are mor-
ally prior to individuals. The Chinese legal tradition has thus had no need 
to resort to jurisprudential fictions of personhood to justify the existence 
of entities that are composed of groups of human beings. To be human is 
to exist in fiduciary communities with others. Rather, to act alone in the 
selfish pursuit of pecuniary gain—to act like a homo economicus—is to 
make oneself less than human, or at least to become a “small person” 
(xiao ren).18 In the politico-moral ontology of Confucian thought, it is the 
kinship group—the family—that is the “natural person,” whereas a self-
seeking individual is an unnatural deviation from the norms of kinship.
19
 
While Confucianism as the dominant ideology of the Chinese impe-
rial state had no trouble accommodating production in collective kinship 
units, it created genuine ideological problems for non-kinship entities 
engaged in the operation of economic enterprise, as Part III elaborates. 
C. Socialism: The People’s Republic of Everything 
If both liberalism and Confucianism have had distinctive ideologi-
cal problems in conceptualizing economic enterprise because of the na-
ture of the primary legal and moral subjects they assume (and as Part III 
elaborates), are the general premises of socialist political and legal theory 
more accommodating? If liberalism’s problem is its prioritization of the 
individual over the collective, both Confucianism and socialism regard 
the collective as ontologically prior to the individual. Of course, the col-
lective subjects of the two ideologies are very different. In the Confucian 
political order, the sole metaphysically “real” subject is the kinship 
group, whereas in socialism that place is occupied by “the people.” 
If we transpose the ideological vision of socialism on the liberal 
state–market–family schema, what do the institutions of socialism look 
                                                         
 18. On xiao ren, see, e.g., A.C. GRAHAM, DISPUTERS OF THE TAO: PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT 
IN ANCIENT CHINA 19–20 (1989). 
 19. It is important to emphasize that while I use the single term “family” to characterize kin-
ship institutions under U.S. style liberalism, Chinese late imperial Confucianism, and state socialism 
in the PRC, I do not mean to suggest that “family” has a transhistorical meaning. Describing the 
Confucian worldview in terms of a liberal state-market-family schema by definition entails the im-
position of a set of foreign categories on it. I use the term “family” simply to refer to a set of institu-
tions in Confucianism that occupy a social space roughly similar to what would be identified as 
belonging to “family” in liberalism. The very fact that Confucian thought defines family as a univer-
sal principle of social organization, rather than one that stands in opposition to the market and the 
state, necessarily marks the notion as fundamentally different. The same caveat applies mutatis mu-
tandis to use my use of the terms “state” and  “market” in this essay. 
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like? In Friedrich Engels’s memorable words, once people organize rela-
tions of production on the basis of freedom and equality, the state will 
wither away and end up where it belongs, “in the museum of antiquities, 
next to the spinning wheel and the bronze ax.”
20
 Needless to say, the po-
litical and economic institutions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
do not represent those of full-blown utopian communism, but rather the 
apparent perversion of socialism that in the twentieth century came to be 
known as “state socialism.” This hybrid political formation is justified by 
the theory that until the final and complete realization of communism, 
the state constitutes a temporary placeholder for the interests of the peo-
ple. 
Nevertheless, “the people” rarely act as a singular subject, beyond 
revolutionary acts of violence, which by definition cannot take the place 
of ordinary political action. In the modern centralized state where direct 
democracy on the Athenian model is simply not possible, popular repre-
sentation necessarily takes institutionalized forms. In the PRC, as in the 
former Soviet Union, the primary vehicle for popular representation is 
not electoral democracy but the leadership of the Communist Party. The 
Party is in fact the sole legitimate entity below the level of the state—or 
parallel to it—that is not simply an extension of it. It justifies itself on 
Leninist grounds by purporting to represent “the vanguard of the peo-
ple.” While the Party is a subset of the people, it is one that professes to 
understand the people’s interests better than the people themselves do. It 
therefore exercises legitimate authority to advance those interests. This is 
the justification for the institution of “democratic dictatorship of the peo-
ple,” exemplified by the Party-state.
21
 
Although Confucianism and socialism could hardly be further apart 
in terms of their ideological justifications for the use of authority—
enforcing hierarchical kinship norms versus advancing “the people’s” 
interests—as ideal-typical orders both insist on a single logic that ought 
to organize all spheres of social life. For it is not only in the political 
sphere that the Party-state exercises direct authority in the name of the 
people. It does so in the economy as well, making allocative decisions on 
the people’s behalf on the basis of a central plan.
22
 
Marx was as unenthusiastic about the bourgeois institution of the 
family as he was about the state. He called for its abolition as a patriar-
                                                         
 20. FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE 232 
(Eleanor Burke Leacock ed. & trans., Int’l Press 1972) (1884). 
 21. See generally MAO TSE-TUNG, On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship, in 4 SELECTED 
WORKS 411 (Foreign Language Press 1975) (1960). 
 22. See generally DOROTHY SOLINGER, CHINESE BUSINESS UNDER SOCIALISM (1984). 
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chal institution of “latent slavery” and a vehicle for the intergenerational 
transmission of wealth.
23
 From a psychological perspective, it constitutes 
an arena of particularistic attachments that divert from the promotion of 
the well-being of all the people. Even Mao Zedong was not able to abol-
ish the family, yet during the Cultural Revolution he wished to redistrib-
ute his comrades’ affective investments from family to politics, effective-
ly urging them to love the people (or the Chairman himself) more than 
their kinfolk. Indeed, to this day even family planning is seen as an as-
pect of state planning in the PRC, not something that can or should be 
left to families themselves.
24
 
This ideological vision of all of social life organized in accordance 
with a single state-based logic, derived from the state’s status as a repre-















Is there a place for a “theory of the firm” in this worldview? As in the 
case of Confucianism and unlike in liberalism, the fact that economic 
enterprise is a collective undertaking is not in itself a problem. In fact, 
from its founding the PRC has devoted enormous amounts of resources 
to setting up large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) of various kinds. What 
is a problem is determining the boundary between the state and the en-
terprise, as Part III explains. 
III. THREE THEORIES OF ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 
Having sketched the general contours of U.S.-style liberalism, Chi-
nese Confucianism, and Chinese state socialism in their ideal-typical 
forms, it is time to examine more closely how each of them justifies their 
preferred forms of enterprise organization. A lion’s share of the analysis 
that follows is taken up by liberalism (section A), while socialism occu-
pies the least space (section C). The very idea of a theory of enterprise 
organization is one that grows out of the context of liberal capitalism. 
Consequently there exists a large literature on the topic, which I canvass 
                                                         
 23. KARL MARX, THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY 52 (Prometheus Books 1998); see also ENGELS, 
supra note 20. 
 24. See Population and Family Planning Law (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Dec. 29, 2001, effective Sept. 1, 2002) (China). 
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at some length below. State socialism too has its own analysis of enter-
prise organization: it simply does not recognize the political legitimacy 
of business enterprises independent of the state. This theoretical position 
is easy to set out without much elaboration. As to late imperial Confu-
cianism (section B), it never had a cadre of economists devoted to ana-
lyzing business enterprise in theoretical terms. However, drawing on an 
analysis that I have developed at greater length elsewhere, I argue that 
Confucianism did in fact have what we might call a “functional” theory 
of the firm, with the kinship group providing the paradigm for the organ-
ization of enterprise. 
A. Liberalism: Economic Theories of the Firm 
That law calls corporations “persons” does not make it so. The state 
and the individual are the unchallenged protagonists of the modern legal 
universe—we take their existence as givens. Economic entities such as 
corporations, in contrast, occupy the murky intermediate space between 
the state and the individual. As Hobbes starkly put it, the existence of 
corporations within the state is like having “wormes in the entrayles of a 
naturall man.”
25
 The two “easy” ways to accommodate their existence is 
to assimilate them to the state, the solution preferred by socialism, or to 
reduce them to groupings of individuals, which affirms the premise of 
liberal individualism. (The distinctive Confucian solution is analyzed in 
section B below.) 
Let us turn to the liberal solution first. As we already noted, it is 
significant that we do not have a “legal” theory of the corporation as 
such—apart from the profound but ultimately uninstructive assertion that 
corporations are persons at law. Theories that dominate legal scholarship 
are pre-eminently economic theories rather than legal ones. I will briefly 
consider two of them: neoclassical and institutionalist theories. 
The neoclassical theory of the corporation takes the premise of 
methodological individualism to its logical conclusion, insisting that the 
term “corporation” is only shorthand for a “nexus of contracts” among 
numerous individual participants in a joint venture.
26
 There is effectively 
no “there” there. Corporation law is only a set of gap fillers: default con-
tract terms that govern when individuals fail to negotiate complete 
agreements as they undertake collective economic undertakings. This is a 
parsimonious, perhaps even elegant, solution. Significantly, however, it 
                                                         
 25. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 375 (Penguin 1968) (1651) (original spelling). 
 26. The locus classicus of the modern neoclassical theory of the firm is Jensen & Meckling, 
supra note 3. 
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has difficulty accounting for various aspects of corporation law that are 
in fact mandatory and not subject to individual contracting in the first 
place. The theory rationalizes such mandatory rules of corporation law as 
representing the “hypothetical contracts” that the parties would enter in-




In contrast, institutional economists seek to analyze firms as they 
exist in fact—as institutions for coordinating collective economic activi-
ty—rather than networks of discrete contracts. Institutionalists resort nei-
ther to legal fictions nor to hypothetical contracts in considering circum-
stances where asymmetries of information or otherwise high transaction 
costs make ex ante agreements costly or impossible. In the institutionalist 
view, there are two primary solutions to this problem: organizing rela-
tions of production in terms of trust or authority, rather than contract.
28
 
Trust is the simpler and least costly solution. People who trust each 
other need not expend time and energy negotiating complex contracts 
and monitoring each other’s performance. Alas, while trust is the most 
efficient solution to the existence of high transaction costs of contracting, 
it is also the most fragile and elusive. Finding people whom one in fact 
can trust is not easy, and those people tend to be limited to family and 
close friends. Although institutionalists recognize the existence, and im-
portance, of trust, they often have difficulty in accounting for it when it 
does exist. Oliver Williamson argues that people trust each other because 
it “pays off.”
29
 Nevertheless, the kind of “calculative trust” that William-
son posits is rather counterintuitive and even the opposite of trust in the 
ordinary sense of the term. 
Employing paid workers represents a solution that is based on au-
thority. When an entrepreneur cannot predict beforehand precisely what 
she will need and when, she is not in a position to enter into multiple 
contracts with outside providers for all the inputs she needs. Just as not 
everyone can be trusted, nor can everything be outsourced. In those sit-
uations an entrepreneur will hire employees to work directly under man-
agerial supervision, with the understanding that during that time she has 
the power—within limits set by employment law—to control her em-
                                                         
 27. The formulation here follows generally what is the most extensive use of neoclassical 
economic theory in the analysis of corporation law by FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996). 
 28. There are many strands of institutionalist analyses of the firm. In general terms, they all 
draw on Ronald Coase’s seminal The Nature of the Firm, reprinted in R. H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE 
MARKET, AND THE LAW 33 (1988). 
 29. Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 453, 466 (1993). 
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ployees directly. Kenneth Arrow describes the employment contract as 
an employee’s sale of her “willingness to obey authority” so that “what 
is being bought and sold is not a definite objective thing but rather a per-
sonal relation.”
30
 In this regard, the employment contract is evidently not 
just another market transaction among others, but a qualitatively distinct 
one: a structure of authority. To institutional economists, corporations 
and other similar business organizations are thus emphatically not mere 
nexuses of contracts in the even wider web of contracts that is the mar-
ketplace as a whole. Instead, they are islands of vertically structured hi-
erarchy in an otherwise horizontally organized marketplace. Rather than 




In light of the above analysis of the political economy of the liberal 
state, it is noteworthy that using trust and authority to explain the organi-
zation of production amounts in effect to borrowing the logic of the two 
primary non-economic social fields: that of the family, in the case of 
trust, and of the state, in the case of authority. To be sure (and putting 
trust aside for a moment), when institutional economists distinguish be-
tween horizontally structured markets and vertically organized hierar-
chies, what they have in mind are economic hierarchies, not political 
ones. Nevertheless, as a structure of authority a firm does rely on what is 
paradigmatically the logic of the state—the power to command—to ex-
plain the organization of production. As a kind of mini-state, a corpora-
tion is effectively a small-scale command economy where factors of pro-
duction are allocated by decree.
32
 
It bears noting that the institutional structures themselves by which 
modern business corporations exercise their authority are also state-like. 
One of the key attributes of the modern centralized state is not only its 
monopoly on the exercise of legitimate violence but also the formal ra-
tionalization of its structures of authority.
33
 The simultaneous centraliza-
tion and rationalization of authority is similarly a distinguishing feature 
of the modern managerial corporation, also administered through a bu-
reaucracy, albeit a private one. Again, while neoclassical theory effec-
tively reduces a corporation to a set of contracts, institutional economists 
borrow the political logic of the state to explain—rather than simply ex-
                                                         
 30. KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 25, 64 (1974) (emphasis added). 
 31. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1983). 
 32 . See generally ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977). 
 33. See 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY ch. XI (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 
1968). 
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plain away—the modern corporation as an institutionalized structure of 
authority. 
Moreover, the business corporation is a hybrid institution embody-
ing not only the economic logic of contract and the political one of au-
thority but also elements of the fiduciary logic of the family. Consider 
the so-called “agency problem” of corporation law. In principle, share-
holders occupy the position of principals in a corporation while managers 
are their agents, charged with the obligation to manage the corporation in 
the principals’ interest, rather than their own. The agency problem is the 
following: given the separation of ownership and management in the 




In fact, the very term “agency problem” is a legal misnomer, appro-
priated from economic discourse. In a legal sense, shareholders are not 
managers’ principals, for they fail to meet the core part of the definition 
of legal agency: principal’s control over agent. Indeed, the agency prob-
lem arises precisely because of shareholders’ lack of control over man-
agers.
35
 In contrast, the manager–employee relationship is a principal–
agent one (since managers have direct authority over employees), where-
as shareholders cannot simply command managers to manage as they 
wish. Rather, their recourse is to vote the managers out, while the right to 
operate the corporation on a day-to-day basis lies with the managers 
themselves. 
Nevertheless, it would be utterly naïve to ask shareholders to simp-
ly trust managers. In other words, as far as the shareholder–manager rela-
tionship is concerned, none of the three main operational logics of the 
liberal state seem adequate: contract (the market logic) fails, as do au-
thority (the political logic) and trust (the logic of the intimate sphere). 
Corporation law has stepped into this vacuum by establishing a fiduciary 
duty for managers to seek to realize the interests of the corporation as a 
whole. This legal duty can be viewed as an attempt to institute, or at least 
legally mimic, a relationship of trust where none exists in sociological or 
psychological terms. It is, in an important sense, an effort to transplant 
the operational logic of the intimate sphere into the corporation. 
Viewed from a macro perspective, what we witness in the corpora-
tion is thus a confluence of all three main types of logics of liberalism, 
                                                         
 34. The classic statement of the agency problem is ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 35. This often-overlooked point is emphatically noted in LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE 
PUBLIC (2012); see also ORTS, supra note 4, at 60. 
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meeting in various guises in a single locus, rather than remaining in sepa-
rate spheres. 
B. Confucianism: Kinship Theories of the Firm 
Having analyzed some of the problems of liberal political theory 
and American corporate jurisprudence, let us turn to the status of busi-
ness enterprise in Confucian political theory. In contrast to liberal theory, 
the collective nature of corporate entities is not a problem, as I have al-
ready noted: it is a Confucian axiom that the collective is morally prior to 
the individual. Instead, historically the main ideological problem for 
Chinese business enterprise has been the officially anti-mercantile atti-
tude of Confucianism and its theoretical (although typically not actual) 
hostility to profit seeking. Starting from the moral premise that the only 
legitimate collective is the kinship group and that one is not supposed to 
take advantage of one’s kin, historically Chinese corporate entities have 
spent much of their energy justifying to the state (and themselves) a type 
of entity that is in fact engaged in profit-seeking at others’ expense. 
Because of this ideological kinship-orientation, there is a long-
standing scholarly tradition going back at least to Max Weber that main-
tains that an important reason why capitalism did not develop indige-
nously in China was the absence of the corporation in the sense of the 
Western legal tradition.
36
 That is, in the absence of the legal fiction of the 
corporation as a person in its own right, by default most Chinese busi-
nesses were merely family businesses, necessarily limited in scope and 
rarely surviving for more than a few generations. As I have elaborated at 
greater length elsewhere, in numerous Chinese “family” businesses the 
notion of kinship was in fact little more than a fiction serving to justify 
the existence of what I have called “clan corporations”—much as the 
personhood of the U.S. business corporation is a legal fiction. In a Con-
fucian polity, an entity that was regarded as a kinship group enjoyed 
recognition by the state, which provided an incentive even for non-kin 




                                                         
 36. For a longer discussion of these characterizations, see Ruskola, supra note 16, at 1613–16. 
 37. The account in the remainder of this section draws on a more extended argument in id. at 
1619–59, and RUSKOLA, supra note 17, at 60–107. It bears noting that by no means am I suggesting 
that all Chinese enterprises were organized as “clan corporations”—only that they constituted an 
ideologically privileged form with maximal legitimacy and legal recognition. Other corporate forms 
of enterprise that engaged in various types of business and productive activities included guilds, 
monasteries, and merchant networks of many kinds. See Ruskola, supra note 16, at 1633–34 n.116. 
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Briefly, in what sense was kinship in clan corporations fictive? 
Chinese kinship idioms are encompassing and often used metaphorically 
in everyday discourse to refer to non-kin so as to recognize and foster 
relations of intimacy and trust. Yet many late imperial clan corporations 
stretched kinship terms far beyond ordinary usage. The pre-eminent ex-
ample of fictions of corporate kinship was the legal “merger” of two or 
more clans. As there are only about four hundred Chinese family names, 
it was not uncommon for unrelated families in the same locale to have 
the same name. If such families wished to pool their capital to set up a 
new business, they would combine their genealogies by fabricating a 
long-dead ancestor to whom they would begin offering sacrifices. Subse-
quently, the “new” clan would draw up a detailed contract to establish 
how to operate the joint enterprise. In addition to instructions for carry-
ing out sacrificial duties in the name of the clan’s ancestors, these con-
tracts often contained specifications on how to manage the assets of the 
ancestral trust, provisions on how to select full-time managers and what 
their duties were, how to keep books and select auditors, and so forth. 
Essentially, the contracts functioned as corporate bylaws in the form of 
trust instructions. In fact, often the parties would take the contract to the 
local magistrate who would in turn stamp and agree to enforce its provi-
sions, thus giving the rules the express force of law. 
Adoption was another way of adjusting kinship relations contractu-
ally. There are cases of a single clan adopting as many as three hundred 
members. In effect poor families that could not afford to hold on to their 
human capital ended up selling it to wealthy clan corporations. The eco-
nomic aspect of these transactions is evident. Adoption contracts speci-
fied the price paid, while the sellers guaranteed title (by representing that 
the adoptee had not been kidnapped or obtained in some other illegal 
manner) and assured that if something should “happen” to the adoptee 
subsequently it would be no longer of concern to the sellers. Likewise, 
wives and concubines were in many ways bought and sold in the market 
for productive as well as reproductive labor, as marriage too entailed a 
written contract specifying the economic terms of the transaction, includ-
ing bride price.  
The utility of organizing economic entities in the form of Confucian 
kinship was not limited to securing recognition from the state. As a con-
sequence of being legally clothed in the “natural personality” of the 
family, clan corporations were governed in effect by family law, which 
in turn supplied a model of enterprise governance in which ownership 
was separated from management. That is, under the norms of Confucian 
kinship, while all the property of a family business is owned by the kin-
ship group as a whole, its management is the province of its senior mem-
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bers. At the same time—again, at least in Confucian theory—in their 
roles as managers the senior kin owe duties of loyalty and care to those 
below them. Conceptually, Confucian family law thus mirrors the struc-
ture of modern American corporation law: managers have the authority 
to run the corporation, subject to a fiduciary obligation to do so in the 
interests of the corporation as a whole. 
In short, insofar as the family was the preferred Confucian theory of 
the firm—and indeed the theory of everything—even non-kin entities 
engaged in the pursuit of profit routinely resorted to fictions of kinship in 
order to make themselves legally cognizable and politically legitimate. 
C. Socialism: Political Theories of the Firm 
The orthodox socialist view has no less difficulty than the Ameri-
can liberal one in coming up with a coherent theory of the firm, but for 
the opposite reason. The conceptual quandary of the theory of a socialist 
firm does not arise from extreme individualism but rather from its oppo-
site, extreme collectivism. In the end, neither assumption leaves room for 
a firm with an integrity of its own. The assumption of collectivism seems 
at first glance more hospitable to corporations, which are after all collec-
tive entities. Yet the problem arises from the fact that in the socialist vi-
sion there is ultimately only one legitimate collective entity: “the peo-
ple.” Upholding the interests of the people is the highest and ultimately 
sole arbiter of legitimacy. Hence, there is little room for political entities 
mediating the relationship between the people and the Party-state. 
As already noted, the orthodox socialist vision wishes to abolish 
even the family, although that goal has turned out difficult to achieve in 
practice. The economic sphere can hardly be abolished, but it too must be 
organized so as to promote the interests of the people as a whole. There-
fore, the only completely unimpeachable form of socialist enterprise is 
the state-owned enterprise (SOE)—or more precisely, the “industrial en-
terprise owned by the whole people,” as the ownership form of state en-
terprises is defined legally in the PRC, in a careful attempt to elide the 
troublesome distinction between “the people” and the “state.”
38
 
Importantly, however, in a planned economy even an SOE has little 
organizational integrity, or what a corporate lawyer would call legal per-
sonality. Ultimately, an SOE is simply one administrative unit in the 
larger national economy—a glorified accounting convention in the calcu-
lus of the larger collective benefit. Even the biggest SOE is only a small 
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Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 13, 1988, effective Aug. 1, 1988) (China). 
2014] What Is a Corporation? 657 
piece of the mother company, as the socialist theory of enterprise organi-
zation ultimately has room for only one enterprise—“People, Inc.,” as it 
were, stated in the parlance of capitalism. 
IV. ECONOMIC THEORIES, LEGAL FICTIONS 
What should we make of our comparative examination of divergent 
ways of conceptualizing economic enterprise, and of the different kinds 
of problems they pose to the internal coherence of the larger normative 
systems of which they form a part? For one thing it seems evident that in 
order to attain ideological purity, the liberal, Confucian, and socialist 
theories we have considered all resort to fictions—whether ideological 
fictions of corporate personhood, fabricated kinship, or aspirational unity 
in a socialist ideal of “the people.” 
The liberal aspiration to maintain the integrity of political, econom-
ic, and intimate spheres is difficult, if not impossible, to enact, as life 
does not yield to ideology. Instead of attempting to explain the existence 
of relations of authority and trust in corporations in economic terms, it 
might better to analyze them simply in the alternative modalities of poli-
tics and psychology.
39
 The state is in fact necessarily and intimately in-
volved in creating and maintaining the market.
40
 At the same time, even 
if authority—in the form of a monopoly on organized violence—is what 
distinguishes the state from other social institutions, it is of great ideolog-
ical significance that we nevertheless justify even the state’s existence on 
the basis of a reciprocity founded on contract, through the metaphoric 
projection of a “social contract.” Yet no social contract is sustainable if 
supported by nothing other than individuals’ self-interest in avoiding a 
short, nasty, and brutish life. At least a modicum of trust is required as 
well. Historically, the sphere of the family is no less plural in its constitu-
tion. As even—or especially—a child knows, the family is not simply a 
haven of unmodified trust but also a structure of authority, with parents 
exercising control over minor children (what John Locke characterized 
                                                         
 39. In fact, many scholars are doing just this. For a political analysis, see, e.g., MARK J. ROE, 
STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 
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ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ-FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1998). 
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as “paternal jurisdiction”).
41
 Equally significantly, feminist theorists have 
challenged the very distinction between the political and the personal. 
The state is no less involved in regulating the family than it is in main-
taining the market.
42
 Finally, the intimate sphere is always also an end-




If the liberal state’s difficulty is in maintaining a separation among 
the logics of authority, contract, and trust, a Confucian commonwealth’s 
problem is the impossibility of making life conform to a single one of 
trust. It will not come as a surprise that the Chinese imperial state and the 
Confucian family unit relied as much on authority as on the (theoretical-
ly) self-enforcing fiduciary logic of trust. At the same time, as we have 
seen, even a seemingly upright clan corporation was as likely to be a 
“nexus of contracts”—a voluntary contractual undertaking—as a “natu-
ral” unit integrated by fiduciary norms of kinship. 
Life is no less hospitable for socialist theory. The work unit of a 
large Chinese SOE is possibly the closest thing to the actual realization 
of state socialism. More than merely a place to work, historically it has 
been an extraordinary cradle-to-grave system of welfare, with lifetime 
job security, housing, childcare, schools, hospitals, and retirement bene-
fits. In other words, it has been simultaneously an arm of the state, an 
economic unit, and a family writ large. Even under socialism it is not 
possible for a single-state based logic simply to displace competing eco-
nomic and familial ones.
44
 
One important conclusion is that what we typically refer to as the 
theory of the firm in our economic and legal analyses would be better 
called a liberal theory—not a universal one. This is not to discredit the 
theory, but only to take note of the assumptions it makes. Our economic 
theories of enterprise surely have considerable explanatory power with 
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regard to U.S. corporations and the U.S. legal and political systems. 
However, when we turn to analyzing other legal systems embedded in 
different political and moral economies, it is vital to be aware of those 
assumptions, for they are as likely to obstruct our analysis as to aid it. 
As an heir to Legal Realism, Law and Economics has helped us de-
naturalize the corporation as a legal entity. This view stands in contrast 
to the views of late nineteenth-century “real entity” theorists for whom 
the corporation was effectively a kind of super-person, a metaphysically 
real entity in its own right, the existence of which preceded law whose 
main task was merely to declare its social existence.
45
 Economists have 
helped to demystify the debate by bringing it down to the level of ordi-
nary mortals. For all our sophistication in regarding corporate personality 
as a legal fiction, all too often even corporate lawyers reify corporations, 
speaking of them as if they were indeed individual actors with subjective 
purposes. Whatever its conceptual difficulties, even a nexus-of-contracts 
analysis denaturalizes the corporation as an entity and reminds us that a 
corporation itself can do nothing: it can only act through its agents. Ulti-
mately only people can sign contracts, commit crimes, or fire other peo-
ple. 
It is thus a signal virtue of economic analysis that it breaks down 
the corporation—and other forms of economic enterprise—as a singular 
entity. However, in this breakdown individual persons become the legal 
equivalents of the smallest subatomic particle in physics: they are the 
legal fundaments of the system, basic units that cannot be broken down 
any further. Although the Romantic attachment to metaphysically real 
corporations has passed into history, our analyses remain dedicated to the 
category of “person,” an ideological premise of liberal individualism. 
That is, we continue maintain a commitment to the Enlightenment idea 
of the individual as a coherent, self-identical subject of free will, even as 
that subject has been taken to task philosophically, psychologically, and 
politically over the course of the twentieth century.
46
 
While this may still be a relatively unproblematic assumption for 
liberal capitalism, it is emphatically not one shared either by Confucian 
or socialist worldviews for which the “real” subjects are the kinship 
group and “the people,” respectively. Just as economists’ rigorous indi-
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vidualism tends to naturalize the individual actor as an ontological cate-
gory—rather than a mere methodological postulate—so lawyers too in-
habit a world where (in civil law terminology) there exist only “persons,” 
“things,” and “actions.” The lawyer’s “persons” in turn are divisible into 
“legal persons” and “natural persons,” the latter being seemingly a natu-
ral category equivalent to the economist’s “individuals.” Yet law can 
never simply describe a pre-legal or pre-political reality. It cannot look 
beyond itself to nature, as there are no more “natural” persons than there 
are “unnatural” ones. Although legal theorists assert that the “only natu-
ral persons are human beings,” even the lawyer’s “natural” person is ul-
timately a legal classification.
47
 As Hans Kelsen noted, “even the so-
called physical person is an artificial construction of jurisprudence” and 
hence “actually only a ‘juristic’ person.”
48
 
This is not to deny that we are born with bodies that can be demar-
cated physically from the environment in which we find ourselves. Yet 
while it seems evident that our bodies mark the boundaries of our “natu-
ral” selves, it is far from clear what the existential or political signifi-
cance of this fact is. From the point of view of liberalism—growing out 
of a Cartesian opposition of self to world, and subject to object—our 
bodies are indeed what separate us from the world and from other human 
beings. Yet in a Confucian view our bodies are what connect us to oth-
ers, and to the world around us. Rather than the one thing that we “pos-
sess” without qualification, our bodies are not even ours, but belong to 
those who preceded us and gave birth to us (given that to date no human 
being has given birth to himself). We are all part of a larger body, con-
necting the dead, the living, and the unborn in a single intergenerational 
entity.
49
 In a socialist understanding in turn the foundational category of 
analysis is the political collective, workers united by bonds of class. 
Considered from this broader angle, we might say that economic anal-
yses typically replace one large fiction with a smaller one—corporate 
legal personality with that of liberal individualism. Whether our “true” 
nature as human beings is our individuality or our connectedness to other 
human beings is a vital existential question that is contested even in the 
North Atlantic world, let alone across wider cultural divides, and it 
seems unlikely to admit of a final answer. 
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When Bayless Manning surveyed the field of corporation law some 
forty years ago he observed ruefully that the “rules, the vocabulary, the 
inherited symbols are all awry.” In response, he urged us to get beyond 
“poetic” metaphors.
50
 Alas, we have no choice but to think in terms of 
metaphors. Some may be more apposite than others, but none are simply 
right or wrong, true or false. The idea of “corporation” has no trans-
historical meaning, nor is there a single correct way to analyze economic 
enterprise. Indeed, so elastic are our concepts that Adolf Berle and Gar-
diner Means regarded the public ownership of modern corporations as a 
way of socializing property and thus a move toward a more communist 
form of ownership in the United States.
51
 In his ethnography of Trobri-
and Islanders in Melanesia, the legal anthropologist Bronislaw Malinow-
ski likens even a group of fishermen operating a canoe to a “joint-stock 
company”—a poetic metaphor indeed.
52
 
Whether economic enterprises are best thought of as voluntary as-
sociations of private individuals, as akin to the family, or as amenable to 
the logic of the state are immensely important questions.
 
And so are the 
corollary questions of the extent to which the family is a public institu-
tion and thus properly subject to state authority, and the degree to which 
the state itself is best thought of in terms of elective kinship and affective 
belonging—or alternatively as only a giant calculator that aggregates our 
individual preferences through electoral democracy.
53
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At a minimum, though, the answers to these questions are not de-
ducible from legal forms. The U.S. legal system tends to privilege bar-
gains among autonomous individuals (legitimated in the idiom of con-
tract) while both Confucianism and Chinese socialism prefer to rely on 
trust among members of communities (legitimated in the idiom of the 
family or the people). If we begin with the individual as the foundational 
unit, private economic activity appears as natural while political institu-
tions need to be explained and justified (say, in terms of “social con-
tract”). In contrast, if one begins with the opposite assumption, treating 
the collective as the basic unit, the question becomes why and when 
should individual actors be allowed to control large concentrations of 
economic resources without moral supervision and political checks—a 
question of considerable concern both to the late imperial Chinese state 
and the PRC. 
Whether we use the template of the individual in social, economic, 
and political organization or prefer the model of the family, or the state, 
it is vital to recognize that our choices reflect ultimately our ideological 
predilections. Whichever model we choose, we must not confuse that 
choice with an ontological discovery. 
V. WHAT IS “ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY”? 
The need to recognize enterprise organization as part of a larger po-
litical economy is not of purely theoretical importance but has consider-
able implications for our analysis of, and prescriptions for, the organiza-
tion of business enterprise in China today. As the PRC first embarked on 
enterprise reforms in the 1980s, among its primary goals was to create 
“enterprise autonomy.” While providing for non-state ownership was out 
of the question, the state wished to establish a space of significant auton-
omy for SOE managers. Remarkably, what was being prescribed as the 
solution to the problems of Chinese SOEs was precisely what constitutes 
the chief problem of U.S. corporation law—a division of labor between 
owners and managers, with the resultant agency problem that corporation 
law seeks to overcome.
54
 
One might view this as a manifestation of a precisely backward un-
derstanding of (Western) corporation law. More innocently but no less 
damningly, it could also be regarded as a case of mindless imitation of, 
and fascination with, things Western (“if American corporations have 
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this problem, we should too”). However, viewed from the broader per-
spective suggested above, it is evident that separating ownership from 
management is a genuine answer, or at least an attempt at one, to real 
problems that are distinctive to Chinese enterprises.
55
 
Let us consider in some detail the agency problems of a classic 
Chinese SOE and its relationship to the state.
56
 If we begin with the lat-
ter, we should note that the Chinese Party-state itself bears a striking re-
semblance to a corporation, at least if we regard the separation between 
ownership and management as a key criterion. In principle, SOEs are 
only administrative sub-units of the state, as we have seen. Ultimately it 
is the people who own all the public assets, including those of SOEs, 
while the state has an obligation to manage those assets in the people’s 
collective interest. The main structural problem of this arrangement is the 
lack of an institutional mechanism to enforce the state’s fiduciary obliga-
tion. 
We might analyze this system also in terms of historical continui-
ties in the organization of state power in China. The Party-state’s rela-
tionship to “the people” is not unlike that between the emperor and his 
subjects. Both regimes owe a fiduciary-like obligation to those they gov-
ern, and both regimes resolve the resulting agency problem in a similar 
fashion: by insisting on the psychological and political unity of the ruler 
and the ruled so that the interests of the two are no longer separate. In a 
Confucian state, the family metaphor turns the agency problem into no 
problem at all, as the emperor is to be trusted like a father. In socialist 
ideology, it is the Party-state’s Leninist claim to stand in for the people 
that denies the existence of a potential cleavage between the interests of 
the state as an agent and the people as its principals. Yet the Party-state’s 
fiduciary duty is as difficult to enforce as fiduciary relationships in the 
family. When the state fails to promote the interests of the people, there 
is indeed no mechanism of control, such as voting the power holders out 
of office, as in the case of electoral (and corporate) democracy. 
Nevertheless, while it may be politically correct to view the people 
themselves as the owners of SOEs, it is economically more realistic to 
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view the state as the true owner, as it is the residual claimant in SOEs. 
Insofar as SOEs are thus owned and managed by the state, they would 
seem to suffer from no agency problem—surely the state is capable of 
monitoring and controlling its own behavior. It would thus seem more 
appropriate to liken SOEs not to corporations but to sole proprietorships, 
with the state exercising full ownership over each one. 
Yet the sole proprietorship analogy too is imperfect. The Chinese 
state is not a singular entity in a meaningful sense but consists of numer-
ous overlapping bureaucracies and supervisory agencies competing for 
control over public enterprises. Historically, managers of Chinese SOEs 
have therefore been subject to the direct or indirect control of multiple 
principals, each seeking to use the enterprises under its supervision to the 
advantage of its own political and administrative constituencies. The re-
sulting problem has hardly been lack of control by principals, but an ex-
cess of inconsistent and contradictory attempts at control by numerous 
supervisory organs of the state. The historic dilemma of Chinese SOEs is 
thus not that the principals cannot control the managers, but that they 
have too much control. The solution to this particular dilemma has been 
to create a greater degree of separation of ownership and control, so as to 
provide for managerial autonomy. 
At the same time, distancing the state from SOEs is not simply a 
managerial imperative. In addition to being the residual claimant in 
SOEs, the state is also the residual deep-pocket. Historically, before the 
relatively recent transformation of socialist SOEs into corporations under 
the PRC Company Law (enacted in 1993 and revised in 2005), when 
SOEs’ operational expenses exceeded their receipts, the state was re-
sponsible for making up the difference.
57
 Thus, when the Chinese gov-
ernment as well as Chinese commentators first began to emphasize the 
importance of “enterprise autonomy” in the 1980s, the term was short-
hand for the need to create enterprises with independent legal personali-
ty—that is, corporate entities with limited liability, thereby releasing the 
state from its obligations to cover the losses of the state sector. In the 
absence of a legitimate (socialist) theory of the firm, the notion of “en-
terprise autonomy” came in effect to stand in for the main structural and 
operational characteristics of Western-style business corporation, includ-
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ing both centralized management (desired by SOE managers) and limited 
liability (desired by the state).
58
  
When we are analyzing phenomena in different political economies 
operating under different political and ideological constraints, it is indeed 
possible that the “problem” of one system may be a “solution” in the 
other. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Putting aside both state socialism and Confucianism, it is a striking 
fact that even in the United States “no consensus exist[s] in the legal 
community as to why corporate law imposes fiduciary duties or what the 
operative ‘principles’ of corporate fiduciary law ought to be.”
59
 If noth-
ing else, this dissensus reflects the ultimate indeterminacy of the legal 
form of the corporation. It is just that—a legal form. To give it substan-
tive content we must have a theory of what a corporation is, or ought to 
be. The multiplicity of our theories of how best to understand, and organ-
ize, business enterprises is in the end a symptom of larger differences 
about the social and political purposes corporations ought to serve. Legal 
analysis alone cannot tell us what those purposes ought to be—despite 
Manning’s heartfelt desire to get our conceptual vocabulary of corpora-
tion law “right.” 
By no means is the desire for definitive analytic categories limited 
to economic theorists. No lesser an authority than the legal anthropolo-
gist Paul Bohannan predicted in 1969 that “within a decade or two” 
comparative lawyers would come up with a methodology that would al-
low us to describe legal systems—foreign and domestic—in “a whole 
new independent language without national home,” something akin to 
“Fortran or some other computer language.”
60
 That prediction has evi-
dently not come to pass. To the extent that our theories of the firm are 
ultimately liberal theories of the firm, they run the risk being limited to 
“the wisdom of the native bourgeois categories” of the West, effectively 
“flourishing as ideology at home and ethnocentrism abroad,” in the cau-
tionary words of another anthropologist, Marshall Sahlins.
61
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To apply liberal economic analysis without modification to non-
liberal legal and political orders risks assuming precisely what we cannot 
know in advance. If we take for granted which phenomena are best ana-
lyzed as economic rather than political ones, for example, we will fail to 
attend to what should be one of the main objects of our analysis—
ascertaining precisely where the boundary between the economic and 
political lies in the system under examination. A fusion of political and 
economic power may be just that: a deliberate fusion, not a confusion.
62
 
The state–market–family distinction represents nothing more (or less) 
than the ideological premises of liberal capitalism, not a transcendental 
truth. As institutional economists know all too well, even less than opti-
mal institutions can persist over time for reasons of inertia—a phenome-
non they characterize as path-dependency.
63
 Importantly, it is not only 
institutions of the material kind that can become path-dependent. Theory 
too can become invested in certain categories, even after they have been 
depleted of their explanatory power. 
The ultimate “agency problem,” in economic enterprise as in life, is 
who gets what? Who counts as a principal? To understand fully the ways 
in which our economic, social, and political relations are organized in the 
modern business corporation, at a minimum we need the insights of psy-
chology and political theory as well as those of economics. At the same 
time, we must keep in mind that the questions posed by corporation law 
have no final answers. There is no end of history for corporation law, any 
more than for history itself.
64
 Where should we draw the boundary be-
tween the inside and the outside of a corporation? Today, the insiders 
include shareholders and managers, which is why the law of corporate 
governance focuses on the dilemmas of ownership and control. But in a 
model of the corporation based as much on membership as ownership, 
might we not include workers too as insiders? Or even the public at-
large? Perhaps even the environment? 
In defining these limits, corporation law is part of a larger narrative 
about personhood—telling us who we are and what we owe one another, 
and indeed who “we” are, or would wish to be. 
 
                                                         
 62. See, e.g., SONJA OPPER, ZWISCHEN POLITICAL GOVERNANCE UND CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE: EINE INSTITUTIONELLE ANALYSE CHINESISCHER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN (Baden Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 2004) (Ger.). 
 63. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990). 
 64. But see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).  
